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We report the results of two field experiments to investigate the usefulness of 
entreaties in reducing protest zero responses in contingent valuation (CV) studies. 
These two experiments estimate willingness to pay for tropical biodiversity amongst 
distant beneficiaries and for reductions in water supply risks, respectively. The 
entreaties in both contexts, in essence, entailed an additional text to ‘talk people out of 
their protests’ using, respectively, a split sample test and a within sample test. Results 
indicate that, in both cases, these scripts were effective in significantly reducing 
protest zeros, with one experiment reducing protests at the payment principle stage of 
the valuation scenario and the other reducing protests at the payment elicitation stage. 
Using entreaties in this way tentatively may be a useful contribution to the existing 
CV literature where protests rates are high and, moreover, appear to ‘defy’ efforts to 
address the issue through best practice in the design and testing of survey instruments. 
However, while protests were reduced by about a third in both cases, the entreaties 
clearly did not eliminate a majority of protest zeros. Moreover, as we discuss, there 
are good reasons why the responses of ‘reclaimed’ protestors remain open to scrutiny.  
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Many contingent valuation (CV) studies experience a high level of protest responses. 
Such responses are problematic since they do not represent ‘true’ economic values 
(Jorgensen et al. 1999). The most common type of protest response occurs where a 
respondent does not provide his or her genuine willingness to pay (WTP) but instead 
states a zero value, referred to as a protest zero (Mitchell and Carson, 1989). This 
presents a crucial problem for the analyst since there is no way to impute the true 
value held for the good (Bateman et al. 2002; Mitchell and Carson, 1989).  
Consequently, the typical approach to dealing with protest zeros is to remove them 
from the sample. This can leave the resulting welfare estimates open to bias and 
reduce survey efficiency.  
 
In this paper, we focus on tackling the problem of protest zeros, through an empirical 
investigation of whether the number of protest zeros reported might be reduced using 
an entreaty. This builds, in particular, on a number of studies which have recently 
used entreaties such as ‘cheap talk’ scripts to deal with the different problem of 
hypothetical bias (see, for example, Brown et al. 2001; Bulte et al. 2005; Carlsson et 
al. 2005; Cummings and Taylor, 1999, List, 2001; Lusk, 2003; Murphy et al. 2005; 
Poe et al. 2002). Despite some success at reducing hypothetical bias, the potential of 
these scripts for dealing with other types of contingent valuation bias largely remains 
unexplored. In this paper, we present two applications that explore the use of such 
scripts as one means to deal with, and understand, protest responses. The first 
estimates WTP for tropical biodiversity amongst distant beneficiaries and the entreaty 
is tested using a split-sample procedure. The second estimates WTP for reductions in 
household water supply risks and the entreaty is administered in a within-sample 
context.  
 
These are, on the face of it, very different policy contexts. However, the problem of 
protest zeros in evaluating preferences for proposed changes in provision is, as we 
find, common to both. In turn, the two experiments that we outline in this paper are 
linked by the shared object to see how entreaties might ‘talk people out of their 
protests’ and so uncover WTP where a respondent otherwise might have registered a 
protest zero. This, we argue, could represent a useful contribution to the existing 
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literature on contingent valuation where protests rate are high and, moreover, appear 
to ‘defy’ efforts to address the issue through best practice in the design and testing of 
survey instruments. However, we do this with a note of caution about how responses 
elicited following an entreaty might be interpreted as a valid measure of preference.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the next section reviews the 
literature on protest responses and developments in using entreaties in stated 
preference studies particularly, but not exclusively, in the use of ‘cheap talk scripts’ to 
deal with hypothetical bias. We then introduce the experimental design used in each 
of our case studies including the criteria used to classify protest responses and the 
research hypotheses. Following this, we present and critically reflect upon our results 
and analysis. We conclude with a summary of our main findings and 
recommendations. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
In this paper we are specifically concerned with the problem of protest zeros, a 
situation which arises where a zero value is reported for a good even though a 
respondent truly values its provision (see, for example, Mitchell and Carson, 1989). 
Such responses are particularly evident in situations where the good in question has 
traditionally been provided free of charge (Strazzera et al. 2003; Jakobsson and 
Dragun, 1996). There are many reasons for this kind of behaviour but typically it is 
the result of an objection to some aspect of the valuation process or contingent 
market: for example, the payment vehicle, the policy intervention, the institutional 
setting, lack of comprehension of the task, insufficient information, ethical objections 
or it may simply reflect some form of strategic behaviour such as free-riding (Boyle et 
al. 2001; Jorgensen et al. 1999, 2001; Morrison et al. 2000; Strazzera et al. 2003).  
 
Since protest responses do not reflect the true value of a good including these 
responses in the final welfare analysis may lead to biased estimates. There is a long-
standing debate about how to react to this insight and, in turn, whether to retain or 
discard such responses for the sake of analysis (see, for example, Halstead et al. 
1992). But, in general, these data are typically excluded from subsequent 
consideration of valuation responses. In order to do this the analyst is required to 
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identify which responses are true zeros and which are protest zeros. The standard 
procedure is to use follow-up questions to distinguish between those that state zero 
because they genuinely do not value the good and those that state zero for some other 
reason (Mitchell and Carson, 1989).1  
 
Clearly, this procedure is reliant on self-reporting and there may be many reasons for 
a respondent’s stated response. For example, Jorgensen and Syme (2000) argue that 
respondents not wishing to pay for valid reasons such as budget constraints may also 
object on the basis of some aspect of the contingent market.2 The waters are further 
muddied by the lack of an established protocol on how to identify protest responses.  
Indeed, a handful of contributions suggest controversy exists over how to define or 
identify protest responses (Boyle and Bergstrom, 1999; Jorgensen et al. 1999; 
Meyerhoff and Liebe, 2006) with some authors considering only payment vehicle 
rejections as protest zeros while others use wider criteria including insufficient 
information and ethical objections (Jakobsson and Dragun, 1996). In effect, two 
separate analyses of the same good could provide widely different welfare estimates 
depending on how the analyst interprets these aspects of the data (Jorgensen et al. 
1999). 
 
There is also debate over the efficacy of censoring protest bids once identified. This 
stems from concern that the exclusion of protest responses may affect the validity and 
potential for generalisation of the results if there is evidence of systematic bias 
amongst those protesting (Bateman et al. 2002; Jorgensen et al. 1999; Mitchell and 
Carson, 1989; Morrison et al. 2000; Strazzera et al. 2003a). For example, Jorgensen 
and Syme (2000) find that censoring protests would bias CV results towards those 
individuals who favour paying for environmental goods or with higher income. 
Schlapfer et al. (2004) found that most of their protest zeros were articulated by 
‘disappointed voters’. 
                                                 
1
 Meyerhoff and Liebe (2009) have argued that these debriefing questions are also important in choice 
experiment (CE) settings. While far less frequently employed than in its CV counterpart, these authors 
present evidence that protest attributes are related significantly to status quo effects (i.e. choosing the 
baseline) in CE formats.   
2
 Meyerhoff and Liebe (2006) investigate possible determinants of protest behaviour and conclude that 
it is related to a range of factors including notably ethical perceptions about norms of provision for the 
sorts of (public) good being valued in these studies. Haddad and Howarth (2006) discuss more broadly 
how ethical considerations and preferences might shape this debate. 
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As a result of the challenging issues that surround the identification and treatment of 
protest responses there has been some exploration of alternative ways to deal with 
protest zeros. Strazzera et al. (2003a), for example, suggest a sequential procedure, to 
deal with the sample selection problem which can occur if protestors are significantly 
different from the censored sample, in CV models with open-ended WTP data. 
Strazzera et al. (2003b) and Calia and Strazzera (2001) also pursue this important line 
of inquiry with regards to the statistical challenge posed by this potential sample 
selection problem. Morrison et al. (2000) use follow-up questions to recode 
protestors, at the model estimation stage, as being in support of the proposed change if 
their concerns could be dealt with: for example, if “… an alternative, acceptable way 
of collecting money could be found …” (p419) and they can afford to pay. In the 
current study, we take a rather different approach to dealing with the problem of 
protest responses by exploring a means of reducing the propensity to protest through 
the use of an entreaty. 
 
Entreaties, such as cheap talk scripts, have been previously used to deal with 
hypothetical bias. The term ‘cheap talk’ itself arises from its use in the information, 
bargaining and game theory literature where it typically refers to the “… cost-less 
transmission of information and signals …” (Cummings and Taylor, 1999, p650). In 
the contingent valuation literature, the term usually refers to a script, typically quite 
lengthy, that is added to the valuation scenario in order to directly draw respondents’ 
attention to the problem of mis- or over-stating true values. As this could occur in a 
hypothetical setting, the script directly asks respondents to frame their response as if 
they were in a real-life setting. For the most part its application has been successful – 
in terms of its impact on hypothetical bias – albeit with some sensitivity to differing 
script lengths, respondent experience and payment levels (see, for example, Brown et 
al. 2003; Cummings and Taylor, 1999; List, 2001; Lusk, 2003; Murphy et al. 2005). 
 
Previous empirical work has involved both laboratory and field experiments. Each has 
its merits. The chief virtue of the former lies in its use of a closely-controlled 
environment allowing an in-depth investigation of behavioural responses such as in 
Cummings and Taylor’s (1999) test of variations of an eight-paragraph script. By 
contrast, field experiments – as we use in the current paper – mean less control over 
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participant behaviour and, typically, shorter (and less varied) scripts. Some studies 
have indicated caution might be the watchword in using such scripts in the field (Poe 
et al. 2002; Aadland and Caplan, 2006). Other contributions have concluded more 
positively (Aadland and Caplan, 2003; Bulte et al. 2005; Carlsson et al. 2005) 
including Lusk (2003) which uses a self-administered format (in a mailed survey) and, 
in doing so, offers support for the use of cheap talk even in the absence of a moderator 
to ensure the script is fully read and assimilated. More generally, if the policy 
relevance of entreaties is to be fully explored it seems important also to test efficacy 
in the field as well as in the laboratory.  
 
Exploring the merits of entreaties also strikes us as worthwhile in other apparent 
problem areas in CV applications. Specifically, in this paper, we investigate whether 
an analogous type of entreaty, i.e. a protest-correcting entreaty, might persuade 
protestors to reveal their true preferences for a good. Interestingly, this speculation 
was anticipated in a study of US water quality by Mitchell and Carson (1984) albeit 
with little divergence being found there between pre- and post-entreaty protest rates. 
More recently, Carlsson and Martinsson (2006) find that an entreaty script reduced the 
proportion of zero WTP responses in their sample, in a CV application to power 
outages in Sweden. In the current paper, we build on this small but interesting body of 
research by focusing on entreaties designed to self-correct for protest zeros in two CV 
applications. 
 
3. Study Design 
 
We conducted two distinct CV experiments in the United Kingdom (UK). The main 
objective of Experiment 1 was to test the use of an entreaty to reduce protest zero bids 
using a split-sample procedure. The survey elicited WTP for protecting tropical 
biodiversity amongst distant beneficiaries. The proposed policy change was adapted 
from Bruner et al. (2004). Respondents were asked to consider a programme which 
would expand the existing global network of protected areas by 30% (about 3.5 
million km2) and further that this additional conservation would consist of ‘high 
priority sites’ in developing countries. Experiment 2 similarly investigated the 
effectiveness of protest-correcting entreaties but in a within-sample context. This 
second survey explored preferences for reducing the risks of interruptions to 
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household water supply. The geographical area of interest was the Thames Water 
catchment which includes households in much of London as well as towns such as 
Oxford and Swindon.3 Within this water catchment, respondents were informed (with 
visual aids) of the risk of water use restrictions (including severe rationing involving, 
for example, rotating cuts to household water supply, and use of standpipes or 
hydrants on streets) with and without a package of investments, the most prominent 
feature of which was the construction of a large storage reservoir (WRSE, 2006).  
 
The payment mechanism for eliciting WTP in Experiment 1 was an international fund 
supported in the UK via increases in income tax. Similar scenarios have been used in, 
for example, Kramer and Mercer (1997) and Horton et al. (2003) and have 
demonstrated WTP values that, in principle, could be captured for biodiversity 
conservation. Nevertheless, there remain legitimate and interesting practical questions 
about the implementation of such measures. Indeed, in initial focus groups for 
Experiment 1, a number of participants expressed concerns about possible 
management problems and difficulties perhaps involving overt corruption that might 
hamper any such large expansion in the protected area network. Whilst CV 
practitioners try to ensure that credible information is provided that allays these 
concerns, Carson (1998) comments on the difficulty of designing tropical forest 
protection scenarios where respondents’ concerns with outright corruption and general 
inability of developing countries to provide the requisite conservation loom large. 
These concerns have a genuine basis in the real world. A key reason why conservation 
programmes involving payment for environmental services are rare in many areas 
particularly Africa is precisely because of such implementation problems. 
Furthermore, there is debate amongst conservation experts that protected areas are 
frequently little more than ‘paper parks’ where protection is provided in name only 
(see, for example, Pearce, 2007). 
 
In Experiment 2, the payment vehicle was the respondents’ annual household water 
bill. It is, in effect, an institutional given that it is the industry that will initiate 
investments in improving water quality and, as in this case, additions to the water 
supply (or management of demand) in the UK. The cost of these improvements is then 
                                                 
3
 Specifically this includes all those households whose domestic water is supplied by Thames Water 
plc. 
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passed on to consumers, subject to regulatory approval, in the form of higher water 
bills. Nevertheless, despite its realism, using this payment vehicle has been found to 
create anxieties in respondents related to perceived excessive profits within the 
industry, controversial privatisation (albeit some years ago), combined with 
resentment about the current level of (and other changes in) household water bills 
(e.g. Bateman et al. 2006). 
 
To reiterate, from the standpoint of eliciting WTP values, these concerns boil down to 
either uncertainty that the good in question will be provided (Experiment 1) or 
objections to the payment mechanism itself (Experiment 2). For the CV practitioner 
the answer to these problems should be to ensure that credible information is provided 
in the valuation scenario that allays these fears. Such avenues, of course, should be 
explored fully as part of the design process and may involve conveying, for example, 
details that might reassure respondents about good project management or monitoring 
in the case of biodiversity conservation (Experiment 1) or a complementary package 
of measures such as fixing leaky pipes to reduce the prospect of water use restrictions 
(Experiment 2). In fact, in the latter case, this was one element of the scenario 
presented to respondents alongside the reservoir which was presented as the main 
investment.4 Dealing, in this same way, with broader scepticism about the water 
industry is arguably more difficult to conceive of. Yet without doing this it is arguable 
that respondents – implicitly – are being asked simply to suspend their disbelief. To 
the extent that respondents are not willing to ‘play along’ in this way, then one 
outcome might be protest responses (particularly protest zeros) or heavily discounted 
WTP values. That such values might not reflect respondents’ true preferences is an 
understandable artefact of the inability of a CV scenario to resolve problems that 
emanate from elsewhere and, moreover, because of this cannot be easily addressed 
through the valuation scenario design.  
 
With this in mind, the scenarios in Experiments 1 and 2 were constructed with the 
explicit introduction of an additional entreaty. The entreaties themselves were 
designed specifically to address any general real world concerns relating to the 
provision of the proposed programmes that were legitimately not part of the scenario 
                                                 
4
 This itself is apparently a reasonable assertion given that fixing leaks and upgrading pipes in itself 
does not augment available water hugely (WRSE, 2006). 
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description (for the reasons already discussed). In other words, the purpose of these 
scripts was to provide respondents with an additional appeal based on residual 
concerns they might have that the proposed programme was not possible (as in 
Experiment 1) or aversion (for example) to the way in which it would be financed (as 
in Experiment 2). In each case, the entreaty text amounted to about half a page of the 
survey5 and invited respondents to set aside their concerns either about ineffectual 
institutions and corruption in developing countries (Experiment 1) or about water 
companies and ‘the government’ more broadly (Experiment 2). The full entreaties are 
presented in an Appendix to this paper.6 
 
In particular, we are interested in the impact that these entreaties might have on the 
numbers of respondents that would otherwise state a zero WTP value which can be 
construed as a protest response. Given that the script, in effect, might ‘talk people out’ 
of their protest bids, the treatments could be said potentially to provide more accurate 
estimates of the true benefits attached to achieving the principle of the proposed 
policy change.7 This emphasis on potential accuracy is important as there are 
undoubtedly important questions to ask about the interpretation of responses elicited 
in the face of an entreaty as we discuss later. We acknowledge that the entreaty 
approach might itself have negative consequences for the quality of subsequent WTP 
responses. For example, this procedure might introduce an element of hypothetical 
bias to the extent that asking explicitly for respondents to concentrate on project 
outcomes divorces their thinking from issues of substance about the processes by 
which the outcomes are delivered. In this sense then, using entreaties might be viewed 
                                                 
5
 Our entreaties are shorter than Cummings and Taylor (1999) 8-paragraph long lab-based cheap talk 
script but are significantly longer than several of the one-paragraph field-based cheap talk entreaties 
that have been used (Carlsson, Frykblom and Lagerkvist, 2005; Bulte et al 2005). Shorter entreaties  
have been found to be less effective (see Poe et al. 2002). 
6
 It should be noted that most CV studies contain some text which could be construed as an entreaty, 
typically urging respondents to focus solely on the scenarios proposed and realistically evaluate their 
ability to pay. However, this normally amounts to a line or two of text only and is therefore rather 
different in scope and content to the more detailed and substantial half page entreaties used in our 
experiments. As noted, shorter entreaties have been found to be less effective (Poe et al. 2002). We are 
grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
7
 It can of course be argued that objections to institutional settings or payment vehicles are a true 
reflection of people’s preferences for the bundled good on offer in CV studies, encompassing the 
outcome of interest and the specific way in which it is to be delivered. However, in both our 
experiments, we are mostly interested in valuing particular outcomes (i.e. biodiversity conservation and 
security of water supply). The provision mechanisms were specified in the scenarios for credibility but 
attempts were made to make them as realistic and as neutral as possible, to minimise their influence on 
the stated preferences for the outcomes themselves.   
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better as a ‘last resort’ and certainly not as a substitute for prior reflection and testing 
of descriptions of scenarios to be valued. 
 
Willingness to pay, in the valuation scenarios of both Experiments 1 and 2, was 
assessed in two stages. The first stage was a payment principle question, in which 
respondents were asked whether in principle they would be willing to contribute to the 
specified programme. Those responding YES or DON’T KNOW went on to the 
second stage of the valuation scenario (and those stating NO went straight to follow-
up questions). At the second stage, respondents were asked to report their maximum 
WTP per annum. The elicitation format in both experiments was a payment ladder. 
 
Protests were identified at both stages of the valuation process. At the first stage, 
respondents stating NO to the payment principle were asked to choose their main 
reason for being unwilling to do so, in Experiment 1, from a list of reasons (including 
an open-ended ‘other’ category) and, in Experiment 2,  from an open-ended follow-up 
question. 8 At the second (payment card) stage, in both experiments, respondents were 
asked to provide a brief explanation for a zero WTP response in a separate open-
ended follow-up question.  
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The experiments differed in the way the entreaty was administered to respondents. 
This is described in Figure 1. In Experiment 1, we used a split-sample design with the 
additional script inserted immediately after the valuation scenario and prior to the 
payment principle question in one version of the questionnaire. The other 
questionnaire version was identical except for the absence of the entreaty. In 
Experiment 2, a within sample test was employed. If a respondent gave a protest zero, 
in response to the payment principle question, that respondent was then presented 
with the entreaty text. The respondent was then asked if, in the light of this additional 
information, he or she would like to re-consider their initial answer to the payment 
principle question. If the answer was in the affirmative then that respondent was asked 
– in the second payment ladder stage of the valuation scenario – to report his or her 
                                                 
8
 The reason for this difference in approach was simply that Experiment 1 was administered in a mail 
survey and Experiment 2 by in-person interview. 
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maximum WTP. Those respondents who had originally stated YES (or DON’T 
KNOW) in response to the payment principle question but were not prepared to pay 
anything at the second stage were also asked to state the main reason for this. Again, 
to the extent that this answer could be interpreted as a protest zero, the respondent was 
presented with the entreaty text and then asked if he or she wished to make a revised 
WTP response. Note that the entreaty was administered only once to any one 
respondent. 
 
Broadly speaking, a protest in the case of either experiment was defined as any zero 
response given on the basis of: (i) concerns over the credibility of the proposed 
scenario or objections to the process whereby the specified change would be 
provided; (ii) objection to some aspect of the payment vehicle, for example, ‘too high 
water bills’ or ‘lack of trust in the institution’, ‘excessive profits’ or ‘government 
should pay’; and, (iii) objection to some other aspect of the valuation scenario such as, 
for example, ‘I need more information’. In large part, the classification of protests 
relies on a strong element of subjectivity with different studies reporting different 
methods of classification. Nevertheless, the latter two categories are frequently 
identified in the CV literature as protest responses. The decision also to include the 
first type of response was due to our contention that these types of respondents were 
not revealing their true preferences for the achieved outcome of the proposed 
programme. Responses which were considered to be valid zeros were those that 
reflected a genuine lack of economic value for the good, for example, ‘I don’t care 
about this issue’, ‘I prefer to spend my money on other things’ or ‘I can’t afford it’.  
 
The inclusion of the entreaties was examined primarily in terms of its effect on the 
incidence and likelihood of protest zero responses. We speculate therefore that the 
inclusion of the entreaty would result in: (i) in Experiment 1, a lower number of 
protests in the entreaty survey version than in the non-entreaty version; and (ii) in 
Experiment 2, a lower number of protests post-entreaty than pre-entreaty. Although 
the main purpose of the entreaty scripts was to examine their effectiveness in reducing 
the number of protest responses, we are also interested in examining whether these 
would have any effect on WTP. This allows us to comment subsequently on whether 
WTP values, given in the light of the entreaties, are significantly different to the WTP 
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of either the without entreaty sample (Experiment 1) or the pre-entreaty sample 
(Experiment 2).  
 
4. Results  
 
In Experiment 1, the survey was administered using a drop-off and mail-back 
procedure and was delivered to a total of 1836 households in six randomly selected 
areas of London in January 2006. In total 601 usable questionnaires were returned. In 
Experiment 2, the main survey took place in July and August 2007 across the London 
and Swindon/ Oxford region of England. It consisted of 746 in-person interviews, 
using a quota sample.  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
A summary of socio-demographic characteristics is provided in Table 1. This 
describes, in the case of Experiment 1, these characteristics across valid responses 
(i.e. positive WTP and valid zeros) and protest responses in both treatments (i.e. no 
entreaty and with entreaty). The table shows that, with the exception of sex, which 
differs between the valid zeros sub-samples in both treatments (but is not used in any 
further analysis), all the observable characteristics of the sub-samples who gave valid 
answers and who protested are not statistically different between treatments. For 
Experiment 2, these same characteristics are illustrated again for those respondents 
classified as giving a valid WTP value (positive or zero) or a protest response. In 
addition, the final column gives the characteristics of those protestors in Experiment 2 
who subsequently stated a positive WTP value in the light of the entreaty 
administered to them. That is, these are respondents who have changed their minds 
about their protest following the entreaty. In the table and, in what follows, we refer to 
these respondents as “new entrants” (to the contingent market) in order to distinguish 
them from the initial valid positive or zero WTP (of “original” or “old entrants”). 
 
Zero Willingness to Pay Responses 
We report the main reasons for zero WTP categorized into valid and protest responses 
in Table 2. In Experiment 1, on average, 23% of respondents with the additional script 
and 32% without it were not willing to pay anything towards the proposed change. 
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The main reasons for zero WTP responses were found to be roughly similar between 
treatments with, for example, the most frequently cited reason – ‘cannot afford to 
contribute’ – accounting for 27% and 25% of all zero responses with and without the 
entreaty respectively.9 Of the valid reasons for giving a zero WTP, the most notable 
difference between treatments is the higher proportion reporting ‘prefer to spend 
money on other things’ which was 1% under the entreaty treatment compared to 7% 
without it. On average, in both treatments, just over half of the reasons given for zero 
WTP consisted of protest responses.  
 
In the case of Experiment 2, column 4 in Table 2 indicates that 224 respondents stated 
a zero WTP (30% of this portion of the sample). Out of these respondents, protest 
zeros clearly predominate and represent 25% of our total sample. These protest 
responses were motivated by a number of objections, most prominently ‘paying 
higher water bills’. The data in column 4 of the table illustrate the incidence of 
reasons for protest zeros before any of these protesting respondents received the 
entreaty text. All those respondents identified as protestors then received the entreaty. 
The final column of the table focuses on “new entrants” only, that is, those who 
changed their mind (56 respondents in all) after the entreaty. The column depicts the 
original reason “new entrants” gave for their initial (pre-entreaty) protest zero. 
Amongst “new entrants”, the largest single protest category is also objecting to paying 
higher water bills, which accounts for almost one third (29%) of total “new entrants” 
in this experiment. However, looking across other protest reasons, 40% of “new 
entrants” originally had given reasons for their initial protest based on some form of 
antipathy towards the water industry (whether this be perceived excessive profits, 
ownership, responsibility or efficiency), while another 24% had expressed an initial 
dissatisfaction with the specified project itself.10 
                                                 
9
 In Experiment 1, some 10% and 4% of protestors (in the “no entreaty” and “entreaty” respectively) 
stated that they were not willing to pay for a range of (self) articulated reasons which did not fall 
exactly within the key categories outlined in Table 2. We therefore grouped them under ‘Other reasons’ 
for simplicity. For the most part, these broadly relate to protests connected to specific aspects of the 
payment vehicle and miscellaneous concerns about the way in which any such conservation scheme 
would work. The incidence of these miscellaneous concerns appears to be lower in the entreaty version 
of the questionnaire. 
10
 There is some ambiguity, as we noted earlier, about the classification of responses such as these as 
protests. Thus, if there were credible alternative options to the ones presented in Experiment 2 that 
might deliver the same reductions in the risk of water use restrictions, then it could well be argued that 
at least two of the protest categories in Table 2 could equally be construed as valid zeros. In the project 
presented to respondents, however, a reservoir was presented as the main solution to water supply 
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[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Effect of Entreaty on Incidence of Protest Zeros 
 
The top half of Table 3 indicates that, in Experiment 1, at the first stage of the 
valuation exercise only a small number of respondents protested to the payment 
principle question. In the entreaty version only 2.7% of the respondents answering the 
payment principle question provided a protest NO compared to 4.0% without the 
additional script. The entreaty, however, had a much more noticeable effect at the 
second stage of the valuation exercise (payment ladder) which received a higher 
proportion of protest responses. Hence, the additional script was associated with a rate 
of protest of 8.9% compared to 13.7% in the version of the questionnaire without the 
script. Overall, the entreaty treatment reduced protests by 34%.11 One interpretation of 
these results is that the entreaty had a reasonably large effect in reducing protest zeros 
in Experiment 1. However, confidence in this interpretation must be qualified. One 
reason for this is that, across the two treatments, the distribution between protest and 
valid zeros (i.e. each as a proportion of all zeros) is very similar. This is particularly 
so at the payment principle stage. We cannot therefore discount the possibility that the 
entreaty had a blunter impact than intended in terms of influencing the tendency to 
state both protest and valid zeros (and thus affect the readiness of respondents to state 
a positive WTP more generally).12 We return to this issue later. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
  
The bottom half of Table 3 indicates that, in Experiment 2, the clear majority of 
respondents stating protest reasons for not being prepared to pay anything did so at 
the payment principle stage of the valuation exercise (about 24%). Very few 
respondents either answered DON’T KNOW or YES to the payment principle 
                                                                                                                                            
issues, together with a wider suite of complementary measures that included fixing leaky pipes. 
Evidence suggests that (whatever its merits or otherwise in other respects) the reservoir is in fact 
crucial to the risk reductions we specified being realised (WRSE, 2006).  
11
 Chi-squared tests revealed no significant difference at this payment principle stage between the two 
treatments. For the payment ladder stage, however, chi-squared tests indicate that protest responses 
were statistically significantly lower (5% sig. level). 
12
 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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question and then subsequently stated a zero WTP when presented with the payment 
ladder (less than 1%). This is in contrast to Experiment 1 where the majority of 
protest responses occurred at the second stage of the valuation exercise, i.e. at the 
payment ladder stage.  
 
The reason for the differential occurrence of protests between experiments is likely 
due to the diverse valuation contexts they cover. Experiment 2 involves paying higher 
household water bills to water companies for reducing the risk of water use 
restrictions. The piloting stages of our research showed that some people, for 
example, were very unhappy with what they perceived as water companies’ excessive 
profits. We would expect some of those feelings to translate into protests at the 
payment principle stage of the valuation exercise as people take the first available 
opportunity to vent their discontent about paying higher water rates, companies 
making high profits, not paying for improvements out of these profits and so on. 
Conversely, Experiment 1 dealt with protection of tropical biodiversity via an 
international fund, which our preliminary research showed most people tended to 
support in principle. Here the objections started when people considered more closely 
the details of the programme being offered in order to value its benefits. Hence, it is 
arguably then at the second (payment ladder) stage of the valuation exercise that we 
would expect some people to start worrying about effectiveness of the proposed 
programme, or about possible corruption among other reasons. 
 
Recall that the entreaty, in Experiment 2, was designed to see if respondents 
registering an initial protest zero might reflect on this response, in the light of some 
additional information about why the valuation question was being asked, and revise 
whether they would be willing to pay. This design means that the WTP data, in effect, 
can be analysed with and without the revised WTP responses: respectively, ‘after 
entreaty’ and ‘before entreaty’. Hence, in the bottom half of Table 3, under 
Experiment 2, the data in the columns ‘no entreaty/ pre-entreaty’ takes a respondent’s 
first valuation answer as final. By contrast, entries in the columns ‘entreaty/ post 
entreaty’ take into account the revised valuation answers of protestors (as well as 
taking the first answer of everybody else). Notably, the entreaty had the effect of 
reducing the ultimate number of protests quite substantially, with about 30% of the 
initial protestors (56 respondents in total) changing their minds in the light of the 
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entreaty. As a result, following the entreaty being administered, protest responses are 
about 17.5% of the overall sample.13 
 
To further explore in a multivariate context the effect of the entreaties on the 
probability of protesting we ran logit models for both datasets. In Experiment 1, the 
logit model explores the likelihood of protesting at the second (payment ladder) stage 
of the valuation where most of the protests occurred. The dependent variable was 
coded 1 if the respondent protested and 0 if not. The results are reported in Table 4. 
As expected, the entreaty dummy variable was found to be a significant determinant 
of the probability of protesting (at the 5% significance level).14 The negative sign on 
the coefficient confirms the findings of the non-parametric results, namely that the 
inclusion of the script significantly reduces the likelihood of protesting. Furthermore, 
the probability of protesting was found to increase significantly with income and 
amongst respondents who considered the environment to be the least important 
priority for additional government funding.15 By contrast, respondents with degree-
level education or above and respondents who stated they undertook routinely 
‘environmental-friendly’ tasks (as proxied by recycling often or always) were 
significantly less likely to protest. Protest responses also declined with the perceived 
likelihood that the protected areas would result in long-term conservation, thus 
suggesting that belief in the efficacy of the scheme is a critical bridge between 
preferences being translated into positive WTP amounts for specific conservation 
schemes.  
                                                 
13
 Note that in Experiment 2 (and unlike Experiment 1) the proportion of valid zeros is invariant 
between treatments by design, i.e. those stating valid zeros did not receive the entreaty. 
14
 In this experiment, we also investigated whether our entreaty was more effective at reducing the 
propensity to protest amongst certain types of individuals. This follows on from the literature using 
cheap talk to deal with hypothetical bias, where there has been some evidence to suggest that cheap talk 
is more effective at reducing stated WTP for certain types of individual (see Aadland and Caplan, 
2003; List, 2001; Lusk, 2003). To investigate this, we re-examined the entreaty effect on protestors by 
comparing the characteristics of those protesting with and without the additional script (using student t-
tests, Mann-Whitney tests and chi-square tests). Overall, the key socio-demographic and attitudinal 
variables were not significantly different for protestors between treatments suggesting that the entreaty 
was similarly effective for most respondent types. These summary statistics can be found in Table 1 
and Table A.2 (in the Appendix).  However, given the relatively small number of protestors we would 
suggest treating these outcomes with caution. 
15
 This involved a ranking exercise of five general issues: crime, education, the National Health 
Service, environment and poverty. This finding itself raises the possibility that, in some degree, protests 
might be related to (conventionally) ‘valid’ reasoning after all. We have taken, however, the standard 
practice in identifying protestors using a debrief response question immediately following the WTP 
question. It is plausible though that digging further than this convention entails might lead one to 
speculate that – for some respondents – protest motives might sit alongside valid reasons for not being 
willing to pay. 
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[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Interestingly, given its within-sample format, Experiment 2 permits us to examine, in 
particular, the characteristics of those respondents who initially protested (N=187 
from Table 3) but then subsequently stated a positive WTP amount (N=56 from Table 
3) in the light of the entreaty text being administered. Table 5 presents results from a 
logit model which includes only those respondents who initially protested (either at 
the first or second stage of the valuation exercise). The dependent variable is coded 1 
if a protestor subsequently changed his or her mind following the additional script and 
0 if otherwise (i.e. the respondent kept to his or her initial zero payment decision and 
so the final WTP amount remained therefore zero). The results indicate that the 
probability of reversing an initial protest zero increased significantly if the respondent 
was female although did not change significantly (at the 5% significance level or 
lower) with any other demographic variable. The experience of household water 
supply problems – specifically, low water pressure, discoloration and supply 
interruptions – is also found to have a mixed effect on the probability of a change of 
mind. Whilst experiencing low water pressure increases the probability of revising the 
original protest answer, water supply interruptions have no effect and water 
discolouration significantly reduces the likelihood of a revised answer.  
 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
What does emerge as significant is whether or not respondents found elements of the 
questionnaire difficult, although again the direction of the effect is not uniform. In all, 
three such variables are included. The first is the respondent’s own rating of how 
difficult he or she found understanding the visual and textual information and 
preliminary questions relating to changes in water supply disruption risk reduction.16 
The second is again based on the respondent’s own assessment but this time relates to 
whether, in a concluding question, the respondent stated he or she found the survey 
difficult overall. The third is based on the interviewer’s assessment of how difficult 
                                                 
16
 In total there were two risk questions of this type. Both questions were designed to familiarise 
respondents with, and test understanding of, a visual representation (10×10 grids) of ‘before’ and 
‘after’ water supply interruption risks along with numerical (risk) information.  
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the respondent found, in particular, the valuation exercise. In the case of the first 
indicator, the finding is apparently that expressing difficulty with the risk (change) 
aspect of the valuation scenario is associated with less likelihood of revising a protest 
response in the light of the entreaty. However, in the case of the latter two variables, 
experiencing, or being perceived to experience, difficulty in the survey and the 
valuation questions increased the likelihood of a respondent, registering a protest zero, 
revising his or her response following the entreaty text being administered. 
 
Effect of Entreaty on WTP Estimates 
 
While the main purpose of the entreaty, in both experiments, is to reduce protests, 
potential effects on WTP are also of interest. The results of the non-parametric 
estimation of mean and median WTP using the raw data, with protestors and outliers 
removed, are reported in Table 6 (with further details on the frequency distribution of 
responses to the payment ladder being reported in Tables A.1(a) and A.1(b) in the 
Appendix, for Experiments 1 and 2 respectively). Notably, in both experiments, there 
are no statistically significant differences in mean WTP between treatments in 
Experiment 1 or between the samples with- and without those protestors who 
subsequently stated a positive WTP amount in the light of the entreaty in Experiment 
2.17 But as mean WTP is based both on positive WTP bids and on valid zeros, we 
conducted some further analysis to see if the entreaty had discernible effects on any of 
these components.  
 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Firstly, in the context of Experiment 1, we might ask what is the effect of the entreaty 
on the proportion of respondents reporting valid zeros? The answer to this question 
indicates a borderline significant difference (10% level) in the number of valid zeros 
reported between the two treatments at the payment principle stage (chi2 = 2.5939, p 
value = 0.107). No differences were detected at the payment ladder stage. The results 
of the comparison of valid zeros are reported in Table 3 (top half). It thus appears that 
                                                 
17
 Moreover, as depicted in Table 1 and Tables A.2 and A.3 (in the Appendix) there were practically no 
significant differences in the key socio-demographic variables, attitudes and behaviours between the 
censored sub-samples across the treatments, in both experiments. 
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the entreaty, in addition to reducing the number of protests zeros, has also had a minor 
reducing effect on the number of valid zeros in this experiment. In other words the 
additional script appears to have encouraged some respondents whom would 
otherwise have reported a ‘valid’ zero to instead report positive WTP bids. 
 
It is interesting to ask why we might have fewer valid zeros under the entreaty 
treatment. A candidate answer might start with the observation that, as discussed, the 
standard procedure for identifying protests is crude. This, in the case of Experiment 1, 
may have resulted in some respondents in the ‘no entreaty’ treatment being 
incorrectly identified as ‘valid’ zeros. If so, then it is reasonable to assume that, under 
the entreaty treatment, incorrectly identified ‘valid’ zeros would be swayed to report 
their true WTP rather than a zero bid, explaining the lower proportion of ‘valid’ zeros. 
Alternatively, as also noted previously, it could be that the entreaty itself had a blunter 
impact than intended in terms of influencing the tendency to state both protest and 
valid zeros, and therefore increasing the likelihood of a positive WTP answer. Note 
that the within-sample design of Experiment 2 avoids this reduction in valid zeros (or, 
for that matter, any potential effects on initial positive WTP amounts) given that it is 
focused only on those respondents identified as stating protest zeros.18 
 
Finally, to explore the influence of the entreaties on the positive WTP estimates, we 
ran interval regression models (Cameron and Huppert, 1989; Haab and McConnell 
2002), for each experiment, using maximum likelihood estimation procedures to 
identify the main determinants of positive WTP values. The results of the regression 
model, for the pooled data (entreaty and non-entreaty treatments) for Experiment 1, 
are reported in Table 7.19 Willingness to pay is found to increase with: income, 
membership of environmental organizations and ranking of environment as a priority. 
A key finding is for the variable ‘Entreaty(1)’. This is a dummy variable taking a 
value of 1 if a respondent received the treatment that included the entreaty and 0 
otherwise. It appears that (positive) WTP is not influenced significantly by the 
                                                 
18
 However, the issue of possible misidentification remains. 
19
 Detailed information on the distribution of all covariates used in this regression across all relevant 
sub-samples and treatments can be found in Table A.2 in the Appendix. With the exception of the 
knowledge variable, the distribution of covariates does not differ across treatments for any of the sub-
samples considered (full sample. valid responses, valid positives, valid zeros and protest zeros).   
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inclusion of the additional script given the insignificant coefficient on this dummy 
variable. 
 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In the corresponding interval regression of determinants of positive WTP responses 
for Experiment 2, however, the entreaty is found to influence WTP significantly. 
Here, the influence of the entreaty is captured by a dummy variable (‘Entreaty(2)’) 
which takes a value of 1 if a respondent’s positive WTP was their answer following 
the entreaty text (i.e. the respondent initially stated a protest zero but changed their 
answer after the entreaty, becoming what we labelled as a “new entrant”) and 0 
otherwise. Table 8 reveals that the coefficient on this variable is both negative and 
highly significant.20 In fact, the parametric estimates of WTP that can be calculated 
from this model indicate that inclusion of the (revised) positive WTP  values of this 
former group reduces the mean (positive) WTP by a little under £5 (from £30.17 to 
£25.60). This indicates, in this experiment at least, that respondents who initially 
protest then waver and state a revised positive WTP value take an implicit relatively 
conservative approach. In other words, the revised positive WTP amounts are, on 
average, significantly lower, than the positive WTP amount of respondents who 
answered thus at the first time of asking. Inspection of the frequency distribution of 
WTP over the payment ladder in Experiment 2 (Table A.1(b) in the Appendix) 
supports this finding. 
 
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In order to give a little more context to this result, we ask the following question. 
What would we ‘predict’ the average WTP of “new entrants” to be based on relevant 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics as well as other observed responses? 
We provide an approximate answer to this firstly by running an interval regression 
(using the same explanatory variables as in Table 8) on those respondents only who 
                                                 
20
 Detailed information on the distribution of all covariates used in this regression across all relevant 
sub-samples and treatments can be found in Table A.3 in the Appendix. With the exception of 
Swindon/Oxford and water conservation, the distribution of covariates does not differ between 
protestors and those expressing a valid WTP, nor between new entrants and the group originally 
expressing a valid positive WTP. 
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stated a positive WTP at the first time of asking (i.e. “original entrants” who initially 
did not protest and thus did not receive the entreaty). We then use the results of this 
regression to calculate what WTP would have been expected to be for “new entrants”: 
specifically based on the characteristics of those respondents in this group.  
 
This implied mean WTP value as predicted for these 56 respondents – making up our 
group of “new entrants” – is £33.77. This value is somewhat higher than the 
corresponding WTP of those who stated a positive value at the first time of asking 
(i.e. £30.17) and those protestors who (received the entreaty but) did not change their 
minds (i.e. 29.76). More significantly, this value (£33.77) is considerably higher than 
the estimate of WTP based on the actual (revised) responses of these “new entrants” 
(£25.60). Put another way, the WTP of these entrants is not what we would expect 
based on their characteristics alone. Differences across characteristics and responses – 
between valid positives (“old entrants”) and “new entrants” are illustrated in Table 
A.3 in the Appendix to this paper. We reflect further on this finding below in the 




Taken as a whole, our results appear to provide evidence that entreaties can be 
partially effective in dealing with the problem of protest zeros, reducing their 
occurrence by about a third in both our experiments. Moreover, this is achieved at 
little cost in terms of over-burdening the valuation scenario given the relative brevity 
of each of the additional texts. In both cases, the entreaty texts were designed 
explicitly to allay the concerns of potential (Experiment 1) and actual (Experiment 2) 
protestors with a focus on reasons that, we knew from earlier stages of the research, 
commonly underpinned protest answers in both of the policy contexts examined.  
 
The question remains as to whether an entreaty is actually needed at all. Surely, it 
might be argued, any well-devised valuation scenario is the end-product of a research 
process, involving qualitative testing, in-depth interviews and so on. As such the final 
design will have minimised problems such as ‘high’ protest rates. This is an entirely 
reasonable argument and is not nullified by the inclusion of entreaty texts such as in 
this paper. In large part, motives expressed in justification of protest zeros, in both of 
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our experiments, were connected to beliefs about the process of how a policy change 
is provided rather than the outcome of the policy change itself. To the extent that such 
beliefs cannot straightforwardly be allayed within a conventional valuation scenario, 
the entreaty text serves a useful purpose. Moreover, using a within-sample approach 
as in the case of Experiment 2, it is possible to analyse the data with or without the 
(positive) WTP values of those who initially protested but subsequently revised their 
answer. 
 
Both entreaties appear to have led to a significant reduction in protests. Nevertheless, 
it is evident that, in Experiment 2 for example, only a minority (about a third) of 
protestors changed their mind. By this same token, however, this also means that the 
majority of protestors stuck to their original response even in the light of the entreaty 
text. In this sense, the entreaty appears to be only a partial answer at best. In addition, 
there may be reasons to be cautious in any interpretation of the WTP responses of the 
one-third or so respondents that the entreaty appears to ‘return’ to the sample. 
 
A positive construal (of these responses), for example, in the case of Experiment 2, is 
that the entreaty text could have given respondents an opportunity to ‘pause for 
breath’ and further reflect on the specified policy change. This might have been 
particularly useful for those protestors who stated, precipitously, that they would not 
even pay in principle. Indeed, one could query the efficacy of a payment principle 
question that arguably permits ‘easy protest’. We can only speculate, in Experiment 2, 
about how many protests there would have been if respondents were routed straight to 
the second stage valuation question. Evidence from Experiment 1, however, indicates 
that a significant proportion of protest responses can also occur at the payment stage 
as well. Less positively, and again in Experiment 2, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that respondents – on being taken through the entreaty text – may have understood it 
as a form of suasion or tacit cue that their initial (considered) answer was ‘wrong’. By 
implication then, these respondents may have reasoned that they simply should revise 
their response accordingly.  
 
In this context, there are divergent interpretations of our finding, from the parametric 
analysis, that the mean of the positive WTP values of “new entrants” (in Experiment 
2) was about one third lower than the corresponding mean for non-protestors (who 
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had a positive WTP for the specified change). On the one hand, one reading of this 
finding is that it could be taken as an indication that the former group did not appear 
to have been tempted, on average, to ‘over-correct’ (which is also apparently the case 
for Experiment 1, where the entreaty did not lead to an inflation of positive WTP 
values). On this view, the lower (parametric) mean of this group could be – on the 
face of it – plausible given the earlier reservations of these respondents about paying 
for the policy change.  
 
On the other hand, and by contrast, it could be that this lower WTP is symptomatic of 
a reaction to the implied suasion in an entreaty. Put another way, those who stop their 
protest – i.e. our “new entrants” – might do this for genuine reasons related to their 
preferences (and which the entreaty uncovers) or they could feel ‘obligated’ to offer a 
positive WTP response which, on average, they keep – for motives that we do not 
observe – low.  While, it is worth pointing out that we did seek to make the entreaty 
text in both experiments as neutral as possible, we cannot dismiss completely rule out 
the latter conjecture.  
 
We can state, however, that the actual WTP of these “new entrants” is rather lower 
than what would be predicted based on e.g. the characteristics of these respondents. 
Depending on the extent to which we are prepared to assume that WTP primarily is 
determined by these observed influences, this might give cause for reflection about 
the efficacy of these revised WTP responses. Alternatively, it could reinforce the case 
for getting such respondents (i.e. “new entrants”) back within the analysis rather than 
disregarding their initial protest responses (as they apparently think rather differently 
about the policy change than inspection of observable predictors would suggest). 
Clearly, we are in danger of raising more questions than we are able to answer, given 
our available data. Yet this ambiguity itself perhaps urges some caution about drawing 
overly optimistic and premature conclusions about using entreaties to talk respondents 
‘out of their (actual or potential) protests. 
 
Moving beyond claim and counter-claim in order to understand more directly why a 
protestor may or may not revise a protest response could suggest the need for detailed 
qualitative testing as a future contribution. Perhaps more useful still could be the 
testing of different variations of an entreaty in order perhaps to get at the issue of the 
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impact of underlying incentives (conveyed within the text). Arguably, this is 
something that would be best undertaken in an experimental setting in the laboratory 




While drawn from distinct policy contexts, the purpose of both the CV experiments 
outlined in this paper was to test the usefulness of entreaties as a means to tackle 
protest zeros. In our first experiment (Experiment 1), the primary reason that 
respondents used to justify a protest zero response can be summed up as an inability 
to believe that the requisite tropical forest conservation can be achieved in practice. In 
our second experiment (Experiment 2), protesting respondents tended to state that 
antipathy towards paying higher water bills and the privatised water companies more 
generally determined their reaction to a proposed scheme to reduce the risk of 
household water supply interruptions.  
 
In both cases, we explored whether an entreaty text can influence the likelihood that a 
respondent will protest. We did so, in Experiment 1, using a split sample approach. 
Almost half of respondents received a treatment that included an additional text 
designed to anticipate protest motives in eliciting WTP for conservation schemes. The 
remaining respondents received an otherwise identical treatment which did not 
include this additional text. In Experiment 2, we used a within-sample approach. 
Respondents stating a protest zero were read an additional entreaty text and then 
asked if they wished to revise their WTP response.  
 
In both experiments, roughly the same proportions – about one-third – of protest 
respondents possibly were swayed by the entreaty text. In the case of Experiment 2, a 
total of 56 respondents who stated an initial protest zero opted to change their mind 
and so subsequently stated a positive WTP amount following the administration of the 
entreaty text. In Experiment 1, however, this inference about the influence of the 
entreaty is more indirect and is based on the difference in protest rates between the 
samples receiving the entreaty and non-entreaty treatments.  
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Notably, in both cases, the entreaty appears to have little effect on (non-parametric) 
mean WTP, calculated after removal of protestors. In other respects, there are notable 
differences in the results. In Experiment 1, respondents tended to protest at the 
payment elicitation stage of the valuation scenario rather than the payment principle 
stage. In Experiment 2 the opposite was found. Furthermore, in Experiment 2, mean 
WTP of those who state positive amounts at second time of asking, on average, was 
significantly lower than the analogous mean positive WTP of those who stated these 
amounts at the first time of asking. In Experiment 1, however, the entreaty had no 
significant effect on stated positive WTP amounts although it did seem to lead to a 
reduction in the number of valid zeros (and reflected in the fact that both protest and 
valid zeroes were reduced in rough proportion between non-entreaty and entreaty 
versions). 
 
Interpretation of these findings involves some ambiguity. We appear to ‘get back’ 
(Experiment 2) or avoid antagonising (Experiment 1) a number of respondents who 
otherwise might have been discarded from the analysis. However, there remain 
legitimate questions regarding the quality of the responses gained as a result of this 
process. Where entreaties are administered to all respondents (as in one of the 
treatments in Experiment 1) it is possible that this text is a rather blunt instrument in 
that it influences responses beyond only the rate of protest zeroes. Furthermore, while 
we sought to keep our entreaty text as impartial as was feasible, it still may be 
construed as say a form of suasion. This problem might be particularly acute in within 
sample treatments (such as Experiment 2) where there is a target respondent for the 
entreaty text (i.e. a protestor). Any conclusion, therefore, that entreaties can be 
effective in dealing with the problem of protest zeros must be tempered by such 
uncertainties in interpreting the worth of responses made in the light of this additional 
text. In future work, it might be that some of these ambiguities could be reduced by 
testing different variations of an entreaty in order perhaps to get at the issue of how 
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Figure A.1(a): Entreaty used in Experiment 1 
 
 
Some people have stated that they would not be willing to pay anything toward the protected 
area programme, not because they do not value it but because they do not really think the 
proposed change is possible.   
 
For example, some people felt that such a large expansion is not possible; some did not 
believe local institutions would be able to effectively manage the areas; whilst others 
simply did not trust institutions in the developing countries to put all the money into the 
protected areas due to corruption. 
 
These are all valid concerns however they do unfortunately mean that it is not possible for 
us to tell whether or not these people place any value on ensuring these tropical species 
and ecosystems are conserved.   
 
To do this we need estimates from people about how much it is worth to them, if 
anything, to ensure the protected area programme takes place.   
 
So, for the purposes of this valuation we ask that you set aside any doubts you may have 
about the plausibility of the proposed expansion and focus instead on how much it would 
mean to you if these outcomes were truly in place. 
 
 
Figure A.1(b): Entreaty used in Experiment 2 
In this study we have found other people such as yourself say that they would not be 
prepared to pay anything for reducing the risk of future water use restrictions. This is 
not because they don’t care about this risk or cannot afford to contribute something to 
reduce it. Rather it is because these people think, for example, that the Government 
should pay or that they have lost trust in the water companies. 
 
It is understandable that people sometimes feel like this. But it does mean 
unfortunately that it is not possible for us to tell whether or not such people think that 
reducing the risk of water use restrictions is important or not. For that, we need to 
know whether it really is worth anything at all to these people to reduce the chance of 
the water shortages – in other words, whether you believe you would be better off or 
not. 
 
So in answering this next question, please put aside any concerns you may have 
about water companies, how well regulated they are, or your opinion of the 
Government. Instead, please focus only on what it would be really worth to you 
and your household to reduce the risk of future water use restrictions. I know 
this is not an easy thing to do but it is really important for us to try to find out 




Table A.1(a) Payment Ladder Experiment 1 
 
  No Entreaty  Entreaty 
WTP (£)  Freq. Percent. Cum.   Freq. Proport. Cum.  
0  43 17.99 17.99  33 12.69 12.69 
0.50  9 3.77 21.76  10 3.85 16.54 
1  12 5.02 26.78  4 1.54 18.08 
2  6 2.51 29.29  8 3.08 21.15 
5  19 7.95 37.24  19 7.31 28.46 
7  1 0.42 37.66  1 0.38 28.85 
10  25 10.46 48.12  28 10.77 39.62 
12  7 2.93 51.05  10 3.85 43.46 
15  4 1.67 52.72  11 4.23 47.69 
20  9 3.77 56.49  29 11.15 58.85 
30  12 5.02 61.51  10 3.85 62.69 
50  33 13.81 75.31  49 18.85 81.54 
60  7 2.93 78.24  7 2.69 84.23 
100  43 17.99 96.23  28 10.77 95.00 
120  1 0.42 96.65  0 0.00 95.00 
250  7 2.93 99.58  13 5.00 100.00 
300  1 0.42 100.00  0 0.00 100.00 
Total  239 100   260 100  
 
 
Table A.1(b) Experiment 2 
 
  
All valid responses (Pre-
entreaty)  New Entrants 
WTP (£)  Freq. Percent Cum.  Freq. Percent Cum. 
0  38 6.80 6.80  0 0.00 0.00 
1  3 0.54 7.33  0 0.00 0.00 
5  86 15.38 22.72  9 16.07 16.07 
10  66 11.81 34.53  15 26.79 42.86 
15  40 7.16 41.68  5 8.93 51.79 
20  61 10.91 52.59  6 10.71 62.5 
25  49 8.77 61.36  5 8.93 71.43 
30  51 9.12 70.48  2 3.57 75 
35  25 4.47 74.96  3 5.36 80.36 
40  23 4.11 79.07  3 5.36 85.71 
45  15 2.68 81.75  0 0.00 85.71 
50  44 7.87 89.62  5 8.93 94.64 
55  5 0.89 90.52  0 0.00 94.64 
60  19 3.40 93.92  2 3.57 98.21 
65  1 0.18 94.10  0 0.00 98.21 
70  33 5.90 100.00  1 1.79 100.00 
Total  559 100   56 100  
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Table A.2: Mean Values for Interval Regression Co-variates in Experiment 1 (Table 7) 
 






















Income £59,341 £57,258 £61,626 £37,916 £67,142  £55,853 £55,383 £56,784 £44,375 £62,132 
Kids 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.6  0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 
Degree 70.5% 71.5% 77.0% 46.5% 64.2%  72.1% 71.9% 74.4% 54.5% 74.3% 
Knowledge 90.9% 90.4% 93.4% 76.7% 96.2%  95.1% 96.2% 97.4% 87.9% 85.7% 
Environmental 
Membership 14.1% 14.6% 16.8% 4.7% 13.2%  13.8% 13.5% 14.5% 6.1% 17.1% 
Environmental Goods 3.2 3.3 3.3 2.9 3.1  3.1 3.2 3.2 2.8 2.9 
High Environment 
Rank 11.7% 12.1% 14.3% 2.3% 11.3%  13.4% 13.5% 15.0% 3.0% 14.3% 
Developed Country 
Help 85.6% 86.6% 91.3% 65.1% 84.9%  86.6% 86.2% 89.4% 63.6% 91.4% 
No. of observations 298 239 196 43 53   298 260 227 33 35 
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Table A.3: Mean Values for Interval Regression Co-variates in Experiment 2 (Table 8) 
 









Swindon/Oxford 0.314 0.317 0.288 0.500 0.348 0.464 0.298 
Income (£) £31926.6 £32049.1 £33089.1 £15579.8 £32009.6 £33549.7 £31351.2 
Sex 0.476 0.452 0.468 0.316 0.529 0.393 0.588 
Impact_A 1.595 1.600 1.647 1.211 1.529 1.429 1.573 
Impact_B 2.043 2.037 2.090 1.632 1.995 1.821 2.069 
Impact_C 4.340 4.337 4.324 4.135 4.422 4.589 4.351 
Bill Problem 0.055 0.054 0.050 0.108 0.059 0.054 0.062 
Boil Water 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.023 
Leakpipes 0.390 0.384 0.385 0.270 0.428 0.446 0.420 
Environmental Membership 0.209 0.207 0.212 0.053 0.231 0.268 0.215 
Supply Interruption 0.157 0.152 0.158 0.053 0.173 0.161 0.178 
Water Conservation 0.895 0.914 0.925 0.711 0.850 0.946 0.809 
Water Butt 0.245 0.245 0.252 0.108 0.254 0.268 0.248 
Garden 0.698 0.693 0.693 0.553 0.743 0.786 0.725 
Garden and Water Butt 0.245 0.245 0.250 0.105 0.258 0.291 0.244 
No. of observations 746 559 521 38 187 56 131 
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Table 1: Socio-Demographic Characteristics 
 
  Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
  No Entreaty Entreaty   
  Valids Protests Valids Protests Valids Protests New 
entrants 
Sex (% male) 47.5 37.1 39.8 50.1 45.8 52.9 39.3 
Age (mean years) 44.2 43.3 44.2 45.4 43.4  45.0 45.0 
Education: 
Degree level or 
above (%) 
71.9 74.3 71.5 64.2 27.2 25.8 25.0 
Employment 
Status (%):        
Employed (>30 
hrs/week) 45.2 45.7 46.0 37.3 47.1 54.0 48.2 
Employed (<30 
hrs/week) 10.0 5.7 8.8 9.8 13.8 12.8 19.6 
Unemployed 1.9 2.9 2.1 3.9 8.2 6.4 8.8 




55,383 62,132 57,258 67,142 31,898 32,010 33,550 
Number of 
Observations 260 35 239 53 559 187 56 
Note: Age/Income taken as mid-point of category/ band. 
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Table 2: Reasons for Zero WTP 
 
 





















I don’t believe the conservation programme 
would work 
3% 4%   
I’m concerned about corruption 3% 0%   
Any payment for this conservation scheme 
should be voluntary OR funded in some 
other way than through taxes OR by 
reallocating revenues from existing taxes 
16% 20%   
I do not pay taxes/ not applicable 5% 5%   
I object to the proposed solution (reservoir)     8% 11% 
I don’t trust government 4% 3%   
The water company should address leaky 
pipes first 
  15% 13% 
I object to paying higher taxes OR water 
bills 
10% 10% 27% 29% 
Water companies make enough profits as it 
is 
  12% 18% 
I object to water companies being privatised   1%  3% 
The water company should pay for this   4% 7% 
The water company is inefficient   8%  12% 
The government should pay for this 6% 5% 3%  3% 
I do not believe the water supply risk 
reductions would actually happen 
  2% 1% 
I'd like to have more information before 
making a decision 
2% 3% 3% 5% 








I cannot afford to pay 25% 27% 11%  
I prefer to give to causes other than 
conservation 
8% 12%   
I prefer to spend my money on other things 
than conservation 
7% 1%   
This conservation scheme is not a problem 2% 4%   
I don’t care about the issue of conservation 1% 0%   
The reductions in risk of restrictions are not 
important  
  1%   
The risk of restrictions is too low for me to 
care 
  1%   
The benefits are too far off in the future   0%   
I will not be living here in when the 
investment is completed 
  1%  
Water use restrictions would not affect me   1%  
 Total number of zero responses 96   68  224 56 
Note:  Expressed as % of zero responses.  
 The columns may not sum to 100% due to rounding error. 




 Table 3: Incidence of Protest and Valid Zeros With and Without Entreaty  
 




Protest zeros  Valid   zeros Protest zeros  Valid   zeros 
N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Experiment 1     
















Experiment 2     

















a Protest and valid zeros expressed as % of total responses. Only respondents stating YES 
or DON’T KNOW went onto the second, payment ladder, stage. 
b In Experiment 1, “Entreaty” refers to the additional (entreaty) text being present after the 
valuation scenario and immediately prior to the payment principle question being asked. 
“No Entreaty” refers to the version of the questionnaire with no additional text at all. 
c In Experiment 2, the entries in the columns under the “No Entreaty” heading refer to the 
initial numbers and frequencies of protest and valid zeros at either the payment principle 
or payment ladder stages. After administration of the Entreaty some respondents changed 
their original response from a zero to a positive WTP. The entries in the columns under 
the “Entreaty” heading refer to those protest and valid zeros which still remain after the 
administration of the entreaty text (i.e. from people who did not change their mind). The 
Entreaty text was administered after the valuation question, either after the payment 
principle question or the payment ladder. This depended on at what stage the respondent 
protested. Protest zeros can differ, therefore, between the before and after entreaty 
administration at either the payment principle or ladder stages. Valid zeros do not differ 




Table 4: Logit Regression on Probability of Protesting at 2nd Stage (Experiment 1) 
 
Variables Coeff. z-stat  
Income (divided by 1000) 0.005 1.68 * 
Degree -0.561 -1.72 * 
Long-term Conservation -0.419 -2.40 ** 
Low Environment Rank 0.762 2.35 ** 
Recycle -1.088 -2.54 ** 
No Developed Country Help 0.635 1.08  
Knowledge -0.488 -0.86  
Entreaty(1) -0.679 -2.32 ** 
Constant 1.232 1.38  
LR Chi2(8) 30.39  *** 
Pseudo R2 0.08   
N 471   
Notes: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Variables are defined as follows: Income: midpoint of annual household income 
band (divided by 1000); Degree: dummy variable, coded 1 if degree level education or 
above; Long-term Conservation: attitude towards the likelihood that the new protected areas 
will lead to long-term conservation of species and ecosystems from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 
(very likely); Low Environment Rank: dummy variable, coded 1 if respondents rank 
environment as lowest priority amongst 5 general issues; Recycle: dummy variable, coded 1 
if recycles often or always; No Developed Country Help: dummy variable, coded 1 if 
respondents do not believe developed countries should help pay the costs of conserving 
tropical biodiversity; Knowledge: dummy variable, coded 1 if respondent has some 
knowledge of causes of biodiversity loss; Entreaty(1): dummy variable, coded 1 if 
respondent received the additional script. 
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Table 5: Logit Regression on Probability of a Protestor Changing Mind Following 
Entreaty Stage (Experiment 2) 
 
Variable Coeff. z-stat  
Sex -1.298 -2.91 *** 
Swindon/Oxford 0.657 1.38  
Age 0.138 1.67 * 
Age2 -0.001 -1.58  
Environmental Membership -0.064 -0.14  
Income (divided by 1000) -0.010 -0.88  
Low Education  -0.587 -1.34  
Risk Questions Difficulty -0.486 2.15 ** 
Survey Difficulty 2.952 2.5 *** 
WTP Difficulty 0.303 2.07 ** 
Strong Views 0.814 1.14  
Process -1.087 -1.78 * 
Pay Bills, Why Conserve -3.804 -1.6  
Water Discolouration -2.570 -2.88 *** 
Supply Interruption -0.248 -0.41  
Low Water Pressure 1.272 1.98 ** 
Constant -5.794 -2.68 *** 
LR Chi2(15) 32.36   
Pseudo R2 0.234   
N 174   
Notes: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
Variables are defined as follows: Sex: dummy variable, coded 1 if male; Swindon/Oxford: 
dummy variable, coded 1 if respondent is from Swindon/Oxford, and coded 0 if from London; 
Age: age (years); Age2: age squared; Environmental Membership: dummy variable, coded 1 if 
member of environmental or conservation group/ organization; Income: mid-point of 
household annual income band (divided by 1000); Low Education: dummy variable, coded 1 
if respondent left school at 16 or younger; Risk Questions Difficulty: coded from 1 (if stated 
that warm-up risk questions were very easy) to 5 (if stated that risk questions were very 
difficult); Survey Difficulty: dummy variable, coded 1 if stated, in response to a final debrief 
question, that the survey was overall difficult; WTP Difficulty: coded from 1 (if the 
interviewer assessed that the respondent found it very easy to state their WTP) to 5 (if the 
respondent was assessed to have found it very difficult to state their WTP); Strong Views: 
dummy variable, coded 1 if stated strong views about how to reduce water supply interruption 
risks; Process: dummy variable, coded 1 if stated that the ways in which water security is 
achieved are as important as having a secure water supply; Pay Bills, Why Conserve: dummy 
variable, coded 1 if respondent stated that s/he pays bill so why should s/he conserve water; 
Water Discolouration: dummy variable, coded 1 if experienced water supply discolouration in 
the past 12 months; Supply Interruption: dummy variable, coded 1 if experienced an 
interruption to water supply in the past 12 months; Low Water Pressure: coded 1 if 
experienced low water pressure (upstairs) in the past 12 months. 
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Table 6: Non-parametric Lower-bound Mean and Median WTP (Protestors and 
Outliers Removed) 
 
 N Median WTP Mean WTP SD 
Experiment 1     
No Entreaty 239 £12.00 £40.19 £54.73 
Entreaty 260 £20.00 £40.35 £57.11 
Experiment 2 
    
Pre-Entreaty 559 £20.00 £25.30 £19.80 
Post-Entreaty 615 £20.00 £25.00 £19.60 
Note: These estimates are based on the raw data using lower bound of interval only. In 




Table 7: Interval Regression Model on Positive WTP Only (Experiment 1) 
 
Variables Coeff. z stat  
Income (divided by 1000) 0.009 5.61 *** 
Kids -0.083 -1.13  
Degree 0.159 0.94  
Knowledge 0.424 1.08  
Environmental Membership 0.567 3.48 *** 
Environmental Goods 0.060 0.73  
High Environment Rank 0.524 2.78 *** 
Developed Country Help 0.454 1.82 * 
Entreaty(1) 0.073 0.52  
Constant 1.500 3.26 *** 
Sigma 1.353   
Log pseudo-Likelihood -1103.72   
Wald chi2(9) 91.89  *** 
McKelvey & Zavoina's R2 0.15   
N 404     
Notes: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Variables are defined as follows: Income: midpoint of annual household income 
band (divided by 1000); Kids: number of children <16 years of age in household; Degree: 
dummy variable, coded 1 if degree level education or above; Environmental Membership: 
dummy variable, coded 1 if member of environmental organization; Environmental Goods: 
frequency of choosing environmental goods over regular products from 1 (never) to 5 
(always); Knowledge: dummy variable, coded 1 if respondent has some knowledge of causes 
of biodiversity loss; Developed Country Help: dummy variable, coded 1 if respondents 
believe developed countries should help pay the costs of conserving tropical biodiversity; 
High Environment Rank: dummy variable, coded 1 if respondents rank environment as top 
priority amongst 5 general issues; Entreaty(1): dummy variable, coded 1 if respondent 
received the additional script. 
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Table 8: Interval Regression Model on Positive WTP Only (Experiment 2) 
 
Variable Coeff. z-stat  
Swindon/Oxford 0.316 5.10 *** 
Income (divided by 1000) 0.007 5.68 *** 
Sex 0.098 1.79 * 
Impact_A -0.023 -0.78  
Impact_B -0.020 -0.65  
Impact_C 0.087 2.64 *** 
Bill Problem -0.205 -1.75 * 
Boil Water 0.390 4.97 *** 
Leakpipes -0.103 -1.87 * 
Entreaty(2) -0.265 -2.93 *** 
Environmental Membership 0.219 3.21 *** 
Supply Interruption 0.054 0.71  
Water Conservation 0.229 2.35 ** 
Water Butt -0.132 -1.10  
Garden 0.015 0.23  
Garden and Water Butt 0.170 1.39  
Constant 2.324 13.26 *** 
Sigma 0.621   
Log pseudo-Likelihood -1373.43   
Wald chi2 (16) 182.55   
McKelvey & Zavoina's R2 0.21   
N 564   
Notes: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Variables are defined as follows: Swindon/Oxford: dummy variable, coded 1 if respondent is from 
Swindon/Oxford, and coded 0 if from London; Income: midpoint of household annual income band 
(divided by 1000); Sex: dummy variable, coded 1 if male; Impact_A: coded from 1 (if Level A 
water use restrictions have no impact on day-to-day activities) to 5 (if restrictions have a very large 
impact); Impact_B: coded from 1 (if Level B water use restrictions have no impact on day-to-day 
activities) to 5 (if restrictions have a very large impact); Impact_C: coded from 1 (if Level C water 
use restrictions have no impact on day-to-day activities) to 5 (if restrictions have a very large 
impact); Bill Problem: dummy variable, coded 1 if had a water/ sewerage billing related problem in 
the last 12 months; Boil Water: dummy variable, coded 1 if received a notice to boil water in the 
last 12 months; Leakpipes: dummy variable, coded 1 if believed that fixing leaky pipes was a 
priority; Entreaty(2): dummy variable, coded 1 if the final stated positive WTP was a revised value 
following the entreaty; Environmental Membership: dummy variable, coded 1 if member of 
environmental or conservation group/ organization; Supply Interruption: dummy variable, coded 1 
if experienced an interruption to water supply in last 12 months; Water Conservation: dummy 
variable, coded 1 if stated a positive attitude to conserving water; Water Butt: dummy variable, 
coded 1 if has a water butt; Garden: dummy variable, coded 1 if has a garden; Garden and Water 
Butt: dummy variable, coded 1 if has a garden and a water butt. 
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